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Abstract Many studies have found that discounting is hyperbolic rather than
constant. Hyperbolic discounting induces time-inconsistent behavior and is
becoming increasingly popular in economic applications. Most studies that
provide evidence in favor of hyperbolic discounting either are merely quali-
tative or they depend on assumptions about, or parametric fittings of, utility
functions. This paper provides a quantitative measure for the degree of devi-
ation from stationarity and the induced time-inconsistency that can overcome
the problems mentioned. This measure, the hyperbolic factor, also provides
simple preference foundations of the most popular discount functions. More-
over, it can easily be calculated from data and does not require knowledge
of utility. Thus, the hyperbolic factor provides an easy tool for theoretical
preference foundations, critical empirical tests, and quantitative measurements
of hyperbolic discounting.
Keywords Hyperbolic discounting · Hyperbolic factor · Time preference ·
Time-inconsistency
JEL Classification D90
Since Samuelson’s (1937) introduction of constant discounted utility, this
model has been widely accepted as a normative and descriptive model of inter-
temporal choice. According to general, possibly non-constant, discounted util-
ity, a stream of outcomes is evaluated by first determining the utility of every
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outcome, i.e. the value of the outcome if it would be received immediately,
then multiplying each utility by a discount factor that corresponds to the time-
point of receipt, and finally summing over these discounted utilities. Constant
discounting implies that a preference between two streams of outcomes is not
affected if all outcomes in both streams are delayed by a common amount of
time.
In the last few decades, there has been an increasing number of empirical
studies suggesting that discounting is not constant, including Benzion et al.
(1989), Bleichrodt and Johannesson (2001), Cairns and van der Pol (2000),
Green et al. (1994), Kirby and Marakovic (1995), Mazur (1987, 2001), Read
and Read (2004), Rodriguez and Logue (1988), and Thaler (1981). If an early
reward and another, later and larger reward are perceived as being equivalent,
then delaying both rewards equally will, for most people, result in a strict
preference for the later and larger reward, revealing decreasing impatience.
As a consequence of decreasing impatience, individuals’ preferences can be
time-inconsistent. Consider a person who prefers to receive two apples in one
year plus one day rather than one apple in one year, but prefers to receive
one apple today rather than two apples tomorrow (Thaler 1981). This person
is decreasingly impatient. If his preferences between ‘today’ and ‘tomorrow’
remain the same for one year, and he resets the clock at zero whenever he
makes a decision, then in one year from now he will prefer to receive one
apple on that day rather than two apples one day later. Thus, his preferences
between the two options will have changed over time. In this sense decreas-
ing impatience may be viewed as reflecting an irrationality. Since Strotz’s
(1956) discussion of time-inconsistent preferences many economic models are
adapted to incorporate changing preferences (e.g. Pollak 1968; Phelps and
Pollak 1968; Peleg and Yaari 1973; Asheim 1997; Gul and Pesendorfer 2005;
Eliaz and Spiegler 2006).
This paper proposes a simple and novel method to quantify the degree of
deviation from stationarity. Remarkably, we do not need measurements of
or assumptions about utilities of outcomes to determine the degree of time-
inconsistency. That is, a measure of decreasing impatience is introduced, the
hyperbolic factor, which can easily be calculated from data without knowledge
of utility. One major advantage of the approach in this paper is that it can easily
be applied to domains of outcomes that are hard to quantify, like, for instance,
health states and environmental conditions. Since utilities and outcomes cancel
out in our approach, outcomes can be taken to be anything.
The hyperbolic factor isolates the time inconsistent component of time pref-
erences. Thereby, it provides a potentially interesting predictor for individual
behavior in the field, like, for instance, smoking, exercising, dieting, and saving.
One approach to construct a measure of decreasing impatience would be to
find out how impatience changes over time. This would require knowledge of
impatience at each time-point, i.e. knowledge of the entire discount function.
Then, to determine this discount function, we would also need to know the
utility function. It is, indeed, commonly believed in the field that such a
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procedure must be followed. Most studies implicitly assume that utility is linear
(Chabris et al. 2008; Viscusi et al. 2008; Kinari et al. 2009).
Surprisingly, as this paper shows, we do not need to go through all these
steps. In fact, measuring the degree of decreasing impatience is even easier
than measuring the discount function. The hyperbolic factor can be obtained
from only two indifferences. Suppose a decision maker is indifferent between
receiving $105 in t weeks and receiving $100 today. Suppose he is also in-
different between receiving $105 in t + τ weeks and receiving $100 in σ weeks.
Thus, if the receipt of $100 is delayed by σ weeks, the receipt of $105 must be
delayed by τ weeks in order to maintain indifference. The hyperbolic factor is
equal to (τ − σ)/(tσ).
Increasingly popular models that capture decreasing impatience are hyper-
bolic and quasi-hyperbolic discounting (Phelps and Pollak 1968; Laibson 1997;
Loewenstein and Prelec 1992; Harvey 1986, 1995; Mazur 1987). These models
have been used in many fields (Akerlof 2002; Harris and Laibson 2001; Krusell
and Smith 2003; Laibson 1997; Luttmer and Mariotti 2003; O’Donoghue and
Rabin 1999; Rubinstein 2003, 2006; Thaler and Benartzi 2004). Most studies
that provide empirical evidence in favor of (quasi-)hyperbolic discounting
assume a particular, often linear, utility function or first need to parametri-
cally fit utility. Thus, the quantitative evidence in favor of (quasi-)hyperbolic
discounting is confounded by assumptions about and parametric fittings of
utility. Most qualitative studies in favor of (quasi-)hyperbolic discounting only
reject constant discounting and provide evidence in favor of general decreasing
impatience, not of (quasi-)hyperbolic discounting in particular.
As will be shown, the hyperbolic factor is also a useful tool for testing the
most popular discount functions in the literature. A constant positive hyper-
bolic factor corresponds to generalized hyperbolic discounting (Loewenstein
and Prelec 1992). Quasi-hyperbolic discounting holds if and only if the hyper-
bolic factor is equal to zero for all points in time except the present (Phelps
and Pollak 1968). If, in addition, the hyperbolic factor is zero at present, then
constant discounting holds. Thus, estimating the hyperbolic factor and testing
whether it is constant will be useful in testing which of the models fit empirical
data best and in testing whether these models are appropriate at all or whether
different models are called for. In contrast to what is done by almost every
study in the literature on inter-temporal choice, this approach does not require
assumptions about or estimations of utility.
The ideas in this paper are inspired by Prelec (2004), who introduced
another measure of decreasing impatience and related it to investment be-
havior. Relative to the hyperbolic factor, his measure is harder to obtain
from individuals in practice: it uses the second derivative of the logarithm
of the discount function, which can only be obtained after measurements of
discounting and utility. Moreover, the hyperbolic factor is model-free, i.e. it
can also be used as a measure of decreasing impatience when preferences
cannot be represented by discounted utility. This is not the case for Prelec’s
measure, which essentially needs a discount function.
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Section 1 defines the hyperbolic factor. This factor is applied to discounted
utility in Section 2. All proofs are in the Appendix.
1 The hyperbolic factor defined
Let X = Rm be a set of outcomes1 and T = R+ a set of time-points. A timed
outcome (t, μ) yields outcome μ at time t and nothing (= 0) at all other
points in time, where t = 0 corresponds to ‘today.’ We examine preferences 
over timed outcomes. The relations ,,≺,∼ are as usual. Preferences over
outcomes are derived from preferences over timed outcomes consumed today,
i.e. χ  μ if and only if (0, χ)  (0, μ). We use μ as the greek analogue of ‘m’
to denote moderate outcomes and χ as a greek analogue (visually) of ‘x’ to
denote extreme outcomes. Thus, χ will denote the larger gain or the larger, or
more severe, loss.
We assume that  is a weak order, i.e  is complete ((s, μ)  (t, χ) or (t, χ) 
(s, μ) for all μ, χ ∈ X and s, t ∈ T , possibly both) and transitive. Preferences
are monotonic if χ  μ implies (t, χ)  (t, μ) for every t ∈ T , and χ  μ
implies (t, χ)  (t, μ) for every t ∈ T . Preferences are impatient if for every
s< t, χ  0 implies (s, χ)  (t, χ) and χ ≺ 0 implies (s, χ) ≺ (t, χ). Preferences
are continuous if for every (t, χ) the sets {(s, μ) ∈ T × X | (s, μ)  (t, χ)} and
{(s, μ) ∈ T × X | (s, μ)  (t, χ)} are closed. Throughout this paper we make
the following assumption.
Assumption Preferences constitute a continuous, monotonic, and impatient
weak order.
Consider two equivalent timed outcomes (s, μ) ∼ (t, χ), with s < t and
μ  χ. Then we have either χ  μ  0 or χ ≺ μ ≺ 0 (μ is ‘moderate’ and χ is
‘extreme’). If the outcome μ is delayed by time τ, then stationarity implies that
the outcome χ should also be delayed by τ in order to maintain indifference.
Thus, under stationarity (s, μ) ∼ (t, χ) implies (s + τ, μ) ∼ (t + τ, χ). Station-
arity reflects constant impatience.
The preference relation  exhibits decreasing impatience if for all s < t,
τ ∈ T , (i) χ  μ  0 and (s, μ) ∼ (t, χ) imply (t + τ, χ)  (s + τ, μ), and (ii)
χ ≺ μ ≺ 0 and (s, μ) ∼ (t, χ) imply (t + τ, χ)  (s + τ, μ). Increasing impa-
tience holds if the implied preferences are always the reverse. Thus, with
decreasing impatience, when we consider two equivalent timed outcomes, then
delaying both outcomes equally will result in less distinction between the time-
points, and, thus, more preference for the timed outcome with the preferred
outcome. In this sense, decreasing impatience reflects that a time difference
becomes decreasingly important as it lies farther in the future.
1All results in this paper remain valid if X is a connected topological space containing a reference
outcome called ‘nothing.’ X can, for instance, be any convex subset of Rm containing zero, or a set
of non-quantified health states.
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Assume another preference relation ∗, which also is a continuous,
monotonic, and impatient weak order. Preferences ∗ exhibit more decreasing
impatience than  if for all s < t, τ, σ ∈ T (i) χ∗ ∗ μ∗ ∗ 0, (s, μ) ∼ (t, χ),
(s + σ,μ) ∼ (t + τ, χ), and (s, μ∗) ∼∗ (t, χ∗) imply (t + τ, χ∗) ∗ (s + σ,μ∗),
and (ii) χ∗ ≺∗ μ∗ ≺∗ 0, (s, μ) ∼ (t, χ), (s + σ,μ) ∼ (t + τ, χ), and (s, μ∗) ∼∗
(t, χ∗) imply (t + τ, χ∗) ∗ (s + σ,μ∗) (Prelec 2004).
Consider again two equivalent timed outcomes (s, μ) ∼ (t, χ) with s < t. As-
sume that (s + σ,μ) ∼ (t + τ, χ). Decreasing (increasing) impatience implies
that τ − σ > 0 (τ − σ < 0). An obvious measure of decreasing impatience
is, therefore, τ − σ. This measure τ − σ, however, will depend on s, t, σ, μ,
and χ, and will be hard to compare across different outcomes and time-
points. The main purpose of this paper is to propose a transformation of this
measure that is better suited as a measure of decreasing impatience, and that
can be compared across different outcomes and time-points. This proposed
measure, the hyperbolic factor, is defined next. It is just as easily observable
from preferences as τ − σ itself. Unlike τ − σ , however, it will be constant, i.e.
independent of s, t, σ, μ and χ, for all hyperbolic discounting models currently
used in the literature, as we will see in Section 2.
Outcomes μ, χ ∈ X and time-points s, t, σ, τ ∈ T , with s < t, τ > 0, form an
indif ference pair if
(s, μ) ∼ (t, χ) and (s + σ,μ) ∼ (t + τ, χ). (1)
In these indifferences, waiting t instead of s offsets the same monetary ad-
vantage as waiting t + τ instead of s + σ. Such a use of pairs of indifferences
(or preferences) to compare tradeoffs across attributes has been widely used
in decision under uncertainty. Examples include Abdellaoui (2002, p. 726,
Definition 6), Blavatskyy (2006, p. 320, TO method), Bleichrodt and Miyamoto
(2003, p. 183, tradeoff consistency), Bouyssou and Pirlot (2003, p. 685),
Chateauneuf (1999, p. 25, C.S.T.P.), Karni (2003), Schmidt and Zank (2001,
p. 486, EL-tradeoff consistency), Skiadas (1997, p. 257, Axiom A10), and
Wakker and Deneffe (1996, p. 1134, TO method). Applications to interper-
sonal comparisons are in Ebert (2004, p. 421, independence) and Pinto (1997,
p. 73, PTO-3), and applications to inter-temporal choice, the topic of this
paper, include Prelec (1998, p. 503, compound invariance).
Definition 1 For every indifference pair as in Eq. 1 the hyperbolic factor is
defined as
τ − σ
tσ − sτ .
Thus, in order to obtain the hyperbolic factor, we only need an indifference
pair. One recipe to obtain an indifference pair is as given in the following
theorem.
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Theorem 2 An indif ference pair can be constructed as follows.
Step I Take any χ  0 and any s, t, τ with s < t, and τ > 0;
Step II Find μ such that (s, μ) ∼ (t, χ);
Step III Find σ such that (s + σ,μ) ∼ (t + τ, χ).
In the second step μ exists, but may not be unique: any μ′ with μ′ ∼ μ will
yield the same σ in the third step. In the third step σ exists and is unique.
For general preferences, Steps II and III may not always be solvable. For
instance, there may not exist μ and σ that satisfy Eq. 1. Our assumptions about
preferences, however, imply that such a case can never arise, so that a μ and σ
as described can always be found.
In Attema et al. (2010) we did an experiment where we used a slightly
different procedure to obtain indifference pairs. We fixed outcomes μ, χ , and
time point s. Then we elicited a t such that (s, μ) ∼ (t, χ). Finally, we elicited
a τ such that (t, μ) ∼ (t + τ, χ), thereby letting s + σ = t. A drawback of the
method in that experiment is that in theory it can be the case that t or τ cannot
be found. Nevertheless, in the experiment such a case did not occur.
Now we can define the function H for every χ  0, s < t, and τ > 0, as
H(s, t, χ, τ ) = τ − σ
tσ − sτ ,
where σ is such that together with a μ and the arguments of H, it yields an
indifference pair as in Eq. 1.2 The function H gives the hyperbolic factors. In
general, H need not always be regular, i.e. H is infinite if tσ = sτ, and negative
in spite of strongly decreasing impatience if tσ < sτ. Yet, as we will see later,
for the most popular discounted utility models in the literature, regularity
holds, i.e. for every indifference pair as in Eq. 1 we have tσ > sτ . Imposing
regularity amounts to imposing an upper bound on the degree of decreasing
impatience, as we will show next.
Consider an indifference pair with corresponding s, t, σ, τ . We saw before
that τ − σ can be viewed as a measure of decreasing impatience. From
impatience we know that s − t < τ − σ < τ. For increasing impatience we have
τ − σ < 0, and therefore also tσ > sτ. Thus, regularity does not restrict the
degree of increasing impatience. Now say that moderate decreasing impatience
holds if 0 < τ − σ < τ(t − s)/t and that strongly decreasing impatience holds
if τ − σ ≥ τ(t − s)/t > 0. Then imposing regularity amounts to ruling out
strongly decreasing impatience.
Let us now summarize the main properties of the hyperbolic factor. It can
easily be shown that non-negative hyperbolic factors correspond to decreasing
impatience. We will see in Section 2 that hyperbolic discounting induces non-
negative hyperbolic factors, and, thus, decreasing impatience.
2It is irrelevant which μ is chosen as long as it satisfies Eq. 1. Therefore, μ is not an argument of
the function H.
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Theorem 3 Let regularity hold. Preferences  exhibit decreasing impatience if
and only if H ≥ 0. Preferences  exhibit increasing impatience if and only if
H ≤ 0.
Note that a similar result would hold for any monotonic transformation of
H. The hyperbolic factor indeed serves as a measure of decreasing impatience,
as shown in the next theorem. Thus, it properly captures Prelec’s (2004)
relative decreasing impatience. When we consider another preference relation
∗, then it is assumed that ∗ is a continuous, monotonic and impatient weak
order, and that the corresponding hyperbolic factors are given by H∗(s, t, χ, τ ).
Theorem 4 Let regularity hold. Preferences ∗ exhibit more decreasing impa-
tience than  if and only if H∗(s, t, χ∗, τ ) ≥ H(s, t, χ, τ ) for all s, t, τ, χ, χ∗.
Thus, we have shown that the hyperbolic factor is an appropriate model-
free measure of decreasing impatience that can easily be obtained from an
indifference pair. To illustrate the measurement of the hyperbolic factor when
discounted utility does not hold, consider the following example.
Example 5 Assume that preferences over timed outcomes are represented by
V(t, x) = e−r(x)tx, where r(x) is a positive function. We will go through the
three steps of Theorem 2 to obtain the hyperbolic factor.
Step I Fix x, t, τ with t, τ > 0 and x  0.
Step II Determine y such that (0, y) ∼ (t, x). It follows that y = e−r(x)tx.
Step III Determine σ such that (σ, y) ∼ (t + τ, x). It follows that
e−r(y)σ y = e−r(x)(t+τ)x.
Substituting y = e−r(x)tx yields
e−r(y)σ e−r(x)tx = e−r(x)(t+τ)x,
which yields
e−r(y)σ = e−r(x)τ .
Thus,
σ = τ r(x)
r(y)
.
The hyperbolic factor is then given by
H = τ − σ
tσ − sτ =
τ
(
1 − r(x)r(y)
)
τ t r(x)r(y)
= 1
t
(
r(e−r(x)tx)
r(x)
− 1
)
.
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Note that if r(·) is a constant function, we have the common constant discount-
ing. In that case the hyperbolic factor will be zero, as we will also show in the
next section.
2 The hyperbolic factor and discounted utility
Preferences  can be represented by a function V : T × X → R if V(t, χ) ≥
V(s, μ) ⇐⇒ (t, χ)  (s, μ). Discounted utility holds if there exist a discount
function ϕ and a utility function u such that  can be represented by
DU(t, μ) = ϕ(t)u(μ),
where ϕ is continuous and strictly decreasing, ϕ(0)=1, ϕ(t)>0 for every t, and
u is continuous, u(0)=0, and there is an outcome χ ∈X with u(χ) =0. Fishburn
and Rubinstein (1982) characterized discounted utility.3 In this section we will
assume that discounted utility holds. This implies a continuous, monotonic and
impatient weak order as in Section 1. We will not assume regularity, but instead
derive it later from other assumptions. When combined with Fishburn and
Rubinstein’s (1982) preference foundation of discounted utility, this section
provides preference foundations for all currently popular discount models.
Under discounted utility, the hyperbolic factor is independent of the out-
comes, as the following theorem shows.
Theorem 6 Let discounted utility hold. Then H(s, t, χ, τ ) is independent of χ.
Thus, from now on we will write H(s, t, τ ) instead of H(s, t, χ, τ ). If we know
the discount function ϕ, then the hyperbolic factors can be calculated by
H(s, t, τ ) =
s + τ − ϕ−1
(
ϕ(s)
ϕ(t) ϕ(t + τ)
)
tϕ−1
(
ϕ(s)
ϕ(t) ϕ(t + τ)
)
− s(t + τ)
,
where ϕ−1 is the inverse of ϕ, which exists under our assumptions.
Two decision-makers with different discount functions ϕ and ϕ∗ that are
related by a power transformation ϕ∗(t) = [ϕ(t)]c have equal hyperbolic fac-
tors, as stated in Observation 7. Thus, in order to measure deviations from
stationarity, we do not even need to know how much people discount in an
absolute sense. This observation underlies the possibility to analyze decreas-
ing impatience without a need to measure the discount function or utility.
Thus, the hyperbolic factor isolates the time inconsistent component of time
preferences.
3Lancaster (1963) used a slightly different approach to model preferences over timed outcomes.
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Observation 7 Let discounted utility hold. Consider two discount functions ϕ
and ϕ∗ with corresponding H and H∗. If there is a c ∈ R such that ϕ∗(t) =
[ϕ(t)]c then H∗(s, t, τ ) = H(s, t, τ ) for every s, t, τ.
2.1 Constant discounting
Constant discounting has been a traditional assumption in economics. Prefer-
ences satisfy constant discounting if there is a constant discount factor δ such
that ϕ(t) = δt for every t. Constant discounting is equivalent to the hyperbolic
factor always being zero.
Theorem 8 The following two statements are equivalent under discounted
utility.
(i) Preferences  satisfy constant discounting.
(ii) H(s, t, τ ) = 0 for all s, t, τ.
2.2 Generalized hyperbolic discounting
Following up on the empirical studies that found violations of stationarity,
Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) introduced the generalized hyperbolic discount
function, which is defined by
ϕ(t) = (1 + ht)−r/h,
with h > 0, r > 0. Generalized hyperbolic discounting is equivalent to the
hyperbolic factor being a positive constant.
Theorem 9 The following two statements are equivalent under discounted utility
for each h > 0.
(i) Preferences  satisfy generalized hyperbolic discounting ϕ(t) = (1 +
ht)−r/h.
(ii) H(s, t, τ ) = h for all s, t, τ.
Mazur (1987) tested a necessary condition for hyperbolic discounting that
also did not require knowledge of utility. He showed that for all s, t with
(s, μ) ∼ (t, χ), t should depend linearly on s with a positive intercept whenever
generalized hyperbolic discounting holds with r = h. It can be shown that his
condition also holds when r = h. We provide a testable condition that is not
only necessary, but also suf f icient for hyperbolic discounting, as Theorem 9
shows. The proof is derived from Loewenstein’s and Prelec’s (1992) and al-
Nowaihi’s and Dhami’s (2006) sufficiency condition.
Harvey (1986) proposed a discount function given by
ϕ(t) = (1 + t)−r.
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This Harvey discounting is equivalent to generalized hyperbolic discounting
with a hyperbolic factor that equals one.
2.3 Proportional discounting
Mazur (1987) and Harvey (1995) proposed a discount function given by
ϕ(t) = (1 + ht)−1.
This proportional discounting is equivalent to generalized hyperbolic discount-
ing with r = h.
It follows that the hyperbolic factor does not distinguish between the
generalized hyperbolic discounting of Loewenstein and Prelec (1992) and the
proportional discounting of Mazur (1987) and Harvey (1995). This is because
the hyperbolic factor only restricts the parameter h and not the parameter
r as we saw in Observation 7. Indeed, on our domain of timed outcomes
the two models cannot be distinguished, because they differ only regarding
the absolute level of discounting and not regarding the degree of decreasing
impatience. This finding reflects once more that changes in impatience and the
corresponding irrationalities can be investigated independently of the absolute
level of discounting.
2.4 Quasi-hyperbolic discounting
Phelps and Pollak (1968) introduced quasi-hyperbolic discounting, as used by
Laibson (1997) and many others. The quasi-hyperbolic discount function is
given by
ϕ(t) =
{
1 if t = 0
βδt if t > 0.
for some β ≤ 1, and some δ > 0.
Quasi-hyperbolic discounting is equivalent to stationarity for all of the
future except the present.
Theorem 10 The following two statements are equivalent under discounted
utility.
(i) Preferences  satisfy quasi-hyperbolic discounting with parameters β
and δ.
(ii) H(s, t, τ ) = 0 for all s > 0, t, τ, and H(0, t, τ ) = ln(β)t(τ ln(δ)−ln(β)) for all t, τ.
Contrary to what is commonly assumed, the degree of decreasing impa-
tience in the quasi-hyperbolic model does not only depend on β, but also
on δ. Thus, it is β in relation to δ that determines the degree of decreasing
impatience. A similar observation was made by Prelec (2004).
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3 Conclusion
This paper has introduced the hyperbolic factor, a quantitative measure of
decreasing impatience and time-inconsistency, which can easily be obtained
from an indifference pair. In addition to being a simple measure, the hyper-
bolic factor is useful in characterizing all popular discount models. Generalized
hyperbolic discounting holds if and only if the hyperbolic factor is constant and
positive. Quasi-hyperbolic discounting holds if and only if the hyperbolic factor
is equal to zero for all future points in time except the present. If, in addition,
the hyperbolic factor is equal to zero today, then constant discounting holds.
This paper showed the value of obtaining indifference by searching for time
points rather than outcomes. Many studies in the literature on inter-temporal
choice elicit indifferences by varying outcomes, not by varying time points.
The advantage of varying time points is that utilities can then cancel out, like
in Casari (2009) and Onay and Öncüler (2007). Thus, by varying time points
one can avoid assumptions about and estimations of utility, when testing the
hypotheses that are often tested in the literature.
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Appendix
Proof of Theorem 2 Consider s, t, χ, τ with 0 ≤ s < t, χ  0, and τ > 0.
Assume that χ  0. By monotonicity and impatience we know that4
(s, 0) ∼ (t, 0) ≺ (t, χ) ≺ (s, χ).
By continuity of preferences and connectedness of Rm there must then be a μ
with (s, μ) ∼ (t, χ) and χ  μ  0. Thus,
(s, μ) ∼ (t, χ)  (t + τ, χ)  (t + τ, μ).
By continuity there must then be a σ with (s + σ,μ) ∼ (t + τ, χ). By replacing
all ‘’ by ‘≺’ and all ‘≺’ by ‘’, this reasoning shows that similar things hold
for χ ≺ 0.
By monotonicity and impatience, μ is unique up to indifference and σ is
unique. unionsq
4By the definition of a timed outcome it follows that (s, 0) ∼ (t, 0) for every s, t.
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Proof of Theorem 3 By regularity, we have H ≥ 0 if and only if τ − σ ≥ 0 for
all indifference pairs as in Eq. 1. Thus, by Theorem 2, we have H ≥ 0 if and
only if decreasing impatience holds. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 4 By regularity, we have H∗(s, t, χ∗, τ ) ≥ H(s, t, χ, τ ) for
every s, t, τ, χ, χ∗ if and only if σ ∗ ≤ σ for all s < t, χ  0, τ > 0 with (s, μ) ∼
(t, χ), (s + σ,μ) ∼ (t + τ, χ) and (s, μ∗) ∼∗ (t, χ∗), (s + σ ∗, μ∗) ∼∗ (t + τ, χ∗),
which, by impatience, holds if and only if ∗ exhibits more decreasing impa-
tience than  . unionsq
Proof of Theorem 6 Let H(s, t, χ, τ ) = h and H(s, t, χ∗, τ ) = h∗. Then there
are μ, σ, μ∗, σ ∗, with (s, μ) ∼ (t, χ), (s + σ,μ) ∼ (t + τ, χ), (s, μ∗) ∼ (t, χ∗)
and (s + σ ∗, μ∗) ∼ (t + τ, χ∗). By discounted utility it follows that
ϕ(s)u(μ) = ϕ(t)u(χ)
and
ϕ(s + σ)u(μ) = ϕ(t + τ)u(χ).
Therefore,
u(μ)
u(χ)
= ϕ(t)
ϕ(s)
= ϕ(t + τ)
ϕ(s + σ) .
Similarly,
u(μ∗)
u(χ∗)
= ϕ(t)
ϕ(s)
= ϕ(t + τ)
ϕ(s + σ ∗) .
By impatience it then follows that σ ∗ = σ and h = h∗. This proves our result.
A similar reasoning proves Observation 7. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 8 Let H(s, t, χ, τ ) = 0 for all s, t, χ, τ. Then
(s, μ) ∼ (t, χ)
if and only if
(s + τ, μ) ∼ (t + τ, χ),
i.e. stationarity holds. Thus, for every s, t, σ ∈ T ,
ϕ(s)
ϕ(t)
= ϕ(s + τ)
ϕ(t + τ) .
Therefore, by setting s = 0, for every t, τ ∈ T ,
ϕ(t)ϕ(τ) = ϕ(t + τ).
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By Cauchy’s functional equation it follows that there must be a c ∈ R such that
ϕ(t) = ect for every t ∈ T . Now let δ = ec. Then, ϕ(t) = δt. The converse follows
easily. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 9 Let there be a constant h > 0 such that H(s, t, χ, τ ) = h
for all s, t, χ, τ. Assume that
u(μ) = ϕ(t)u(χ) and ϕ(σ)u(μ) = ϕ(t + τ)u(χ),
with t > 0. Then we must have
τ − σ
tσ
= h.
Let k = 1 + ht. It follows that t + τ = t + kσ. Moreover, k is a constant that
depends only on t. Al-Nowaihi and Dhami (2006), inspired by Loewenstein
and Prelec (1992), showed that this implies that the discount function is of
the generalized hyperbolic form. Thus, there must be parameters h˜, r such
that ϕ(t) = (1 + h˜t)−r/h˜. It follows that h˜ = h. From the assumption that ϕ(·) is
strictly decreasing it follows that r > 0. This proves one direction of our result.
The proof of the other direction is straightforward. unionsq
Proof of Theorem 10 Let H(s, t, χ, τ ) = 0 for all s > 0, t, χ, τ. Then for every
s, t, σ ∈ T , with s, t > 0
ϕ(s)
ϕ(t)
= ϕ(s + σ)
ϕ(t + σ) .
Let s0 > 0. Define the function ϕ0 on T by ϕ0(t) = ϕ(t + s0)/ϕ(s0). Then for
every s, t, σ ∈ T ,
ϕ0(s)
ϕ0(t)
= ϕ(s + s0)
ϕ(t + s0) =
ϕ(s + s0 + σ)
ϕ(t + s0 + σ) =
ϕ0(s + σ)
ϕ0(t + σ) .
Moreover, ϕ0(0) = 1. By Cauchy’s functional equation it follows that there
must be a c0 ∈ R such that ϕ0(t) = ec0t for every t ∈ T . Therefore, ϕ(t + s0) =
ec0tϕ(s0) for every t ∈ T . Thus, ϕ(t) = ec0(t−s0)ϕ(s0) for all t ≥ s0. Define δ0 = ec0
and β0 = e−c0s0ϕ(s0). Then ϕ(t) = β0δt0 for all t ≥ s0. Similarly, consider an s1
with 0 < s1 < s0 and with corresponding β1 and ϕ1. It follows that for all t ≥ s0,
ϕ(t) = β1δt1 = β0δt0, so β0 = β1 and δ0 = δ1. We can continue this argument
repeatedly.
Thus, letting β = β0 and δ = δ0 we obtain ϕ(t) = βδt for all t > 0. By
definition we have ϕ(0) = 1.
Now, by letting s = 0 we obtain H(0, t, τ ) = ln(β)t(τ ln(δ)−ln(β)) as follows. For an
indifference pair
(0, μ) ∼ (t, χ) and (σ, μ) ∼ (t + τ, χ).
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we have
1
βδt
= ϕ(0)
ϕ(t)
= ϕ(σ)
ϕ(t + τ) =
βδσ
βδt+τ
.
It follows that 1/β = δ(σ−τ). Thus, τ − σ = ln(β)/ ln(δ). The result follows. unionsq
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